Human Flotsam, Legal Fallout: Japan’s Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown by Leflar, Robert B. et al.
LEFLAR 7/10/2012 9:22 AM 
 
[107] 




Human Flotsam, Legal Fallout:  
Japan’s Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown 
I.  What Happened ..................................................................... 108 
II.  Legal Professionals and the Problems Disaster Victims 
Face ....................................................................................... 114 
 A. The Legal Aid Lawyers: Kabata and Yorikane .............. 116 
 B. The Limited-Practice Legal Professional: Suganami ..... 119 
 C. The Community Leaders in Minami-Sōma: 
Matsumoto and Araki ..................................................... 119 
 D. The Small-Town Lawyer in Minami-Sōma: 
Wakasugi ........................................................................ 120 
 E. The Iwaki City Lawyer: Watanabe ................................ 121 
III.  Conclusion ............................................................................. 123 
 
After an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant accident of 
historic proportions, how can lawyers help sort out the mess? In July 
2011, we conducted interviews in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, the 
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site of the world’s most recent nuclear disaster, to make a first cut at 
answering that question. This Article is a report on that field research. 
I 
WHAT HAPPENED 
The earthquake and tsunami that hit northeast Japan on March 11, 
2011, devastated 300 miles of coastline, inundated low-lying cities, 
towns, and villages, and knocked out the cooling systems of all six 
reactors in Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, operated by Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The knockout of the cooling 
systems resulted in partial to total meltdowns in three of the reactor 
cores, and pressure soared within the containment vessels.1 One 
reactor building exploded, others were severely damaged, and 
radioactive debris contaminated the atmosphere and surrounding 
region, extending to the Tokyo area and beyond.2 By one expert 
estimate, the radiation that escaped into the atmosphere was twenty to 
thirty times that released by the atomic bomb over Hiroshima.3 
At the time of this writing, the count of lives lost has mounted to 
almost 20,000: 15,854 confirmed dead and 3167 confirmed missing.4 
These mortality figures represent only the beginning of the human 
toll. 
 
1 Phred Dvorak, Reactor Team Let Pressure Soar, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2011, at A1, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039225045762732341108 
96182.html. 
2 Id. 
3 Tatsuhiko Kodama, Committee on Health, Welfare, and Labor, House of 
Representatives (July 27, 2011), available at http://www.shugiintv.go.jp/jp/wmpdyna.asx 
?deli_id=41163&media_type=wb&lang=j&spkid=21080&time=01:07:01.4 (estimating 
that the radioactivity release in Fukushima was 29.6 times the Hiroshima explosion 
calculated on a caloric (energy) base, and twenty times the Hiroshima explosion on a 
uranium base). 
4 Heisei 23-nen (2011) Tōhoku chihō Taiheiyō-chū jishin no higai jōkyō to keisatsu 
sochi [Damage from the 2011 Northeast Japan Earthquake and Police Response], NAT’L 
POLICE AGENCY (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki /higaijokyo.pdf 
(current figures on human toll and damage to manmade structures). 
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Figure 1. Fallout plumes; evacuation zones.5 
 
5 Map published in YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Tokyo), Aug. 30, 2011, available at 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/zoom/20110829-OYT9I01197.htm (translated and edited by 
Shozo Ota). 
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Exodus follows disaster. The lands surrounding the crippled 
reactors emptied out. The central government decreed two concentric 
crescent-shaped zones: a mandatory evacuation zone and an 
“evacuation preparation zone.”6 Within the half-moon-shaped inner 
crescent twenty kilometers (twelve miles) from the reactors, no one is 
allowed to live or visit without special permission until the 
government lifts the edict.7 About 10,500 residents were ejected from 
their homes and businesses in this “no-go” evacuation zone.8 In the 
outer crescent twenty to thirty kilometers (twelve to nineteen miles) 
from the meltdown, a swath affecting almost 60,000 people, residents 
were told to prepare for evacuation in case of emergency and to stay 
indoors as much as possible.9 In these areas, and in other coastal areas 
devastated by the tsunami but further from the damaged reactors (see 
Figure 2), families scattered,10 schools and businesses closed, and the 
twisted wreckage of homes, buildings, cars, fishing boats, and roads 
littered the countryside. 
 
6 The scientific basis of these danger crescents has been attacked as arbitrary and not 
based on sound science. For example, the government’s SPEEDI (System for Prediction of 
Environmental Emergency Dose Information) system apparently indicated early on that 
the radiation plume would endanger areas (to which children were being bussed) well 
outside the twelve-mile no-go area. In spite of the fact that this information was available, 
decision makers ignored SPEEDI in the days following the meltdown. Norimitsu Onishi & 
Martin Fackler, Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
9, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/asia/09japan.html. 
See fig.1. 
7 No-go Zone Easing May Be Moved Up, JAPAN TIMES, July 18, 2011, http://www 
.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110718a1.html. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. (noting that some “hot spot” areas outside the twenty kilometer evacuation zone, 
where measured radiation levels were high, were also designated as “planned evacuation 
areas”). 
10 The Vice Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry reported to the Diet that the total 
number of evacuees was about 113,000. Genpatsu jiko ni yoru hinansha-sū [Number of 
Evacuees from Nuclear Accident], AKAHATA, June 17, 2011, http://www.npa.go.jp 
/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf (reporting Vice Minister’s response to Rep. Shiokawa’s 
question). 
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Figure 2. Tsunami-stricken areas.11 
 
11 Shozo Ota, Tsunami-Stricken Areas (Mar. 29, 2012) (unpublished figure) (on file 
with author). 
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Some residents remain in their homes outside the “no-go” zone,12 
but the lack of open schools, stores, medical care, and jobs makes life 
difficult. Farmers found their fields, orchards, and paddies ruined by 
seawater and contaminated by radiation.13 Fishermen located their 
wrecked boats, swept inland by the tsunami, in fields a mile or more 
from the harbor. (A few fishermen had saved their craft by heeding 
the stories of old-timers and on hearing the tsunami warning, 
immediately taking their craft out to sea, breasting the enormous 
waves.)14 Hospitals and clinics had their beds and instruments washed 
away. Seaside resorts saw bookings drop to zero. Property values 
plummeted. Towns became ghost towns. 
Both TEPCO and the central government are targets of widespread 
and bitter criticism, both over their handling of the crisis and of their 
various failures to prepare adequately for such an event.15 While an 
analysis of these failures is outside the scope of this Article, it is 
noteworthy that the resulting public distrust of these institutions is a 
key feature of the atmosphere in which the area’s legal professionals 
work. 
TEPCO initially responded by providing a first round of partial 
provisional compensation payments to residents displaced by 
government orders from the “no-go” inner crescent: ¥1 million 
(US$12,500) for households and ¥750,000 (US$9400) for 
individuals.16 The compensation amount was recommended by the 
 
12 Editorial, Create Environment for N-Evacuees’ Return, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), 
Aug. 13, 2011, at 2, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110813002771 
.htm (noting that of about 58,500 residents of the evacuation preparation zone, about 
25,000 had evacuated). 
13 See Fukushima Food Producers Protest, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 13, 2011, at 
1, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110812005552.htm (demonstration 
in Tokyo by farmers and fishermen seeking compensation for losses). 
14 Devastated Towns Stuck in Limbo, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at 2, available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110808a3.html (reporting how Choya Goto saved 
his fishing boat). 
15 See, e.g., Fukushima Accident: Disaster Response Failed—Report, BBC NEWS ASIA, 
Dec. 26, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16334434 (noting that a blue-ribbon 
commission backed up widespread charges of industry and regulatory failings in a report 
issued in December 2011). See also Yoichi Funabashi & Kay Kitazawa, Fukushima in 
Review: A Complex Disaster, A Disastrous Response, 68(2) BULL. OF THE ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS 9 (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/2/9.full.pdf 
(English-language version of summary chapter). 
16 Tōden, 4-gatsu-chū ni 100-man-en shiharai kaishi; Genpatsu hinan jūmin ni 
[TEPCO to Begin Compensation to Nuclear Evacuees with ¥1 Million Initial Payments by 
End of April], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Apr. 15, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/national/update 
/0415/TKY201104150087.html. 
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national government and paid by TEPCO.17 Businesses were eligible 
for compensation for half their demonstrated losses up to ¥2.5 million 
(US$31,000) upon submission of documentation.18 A second round of 
further compensation payments was announced August 4, 2011.19 In a 
year-end supplementary decision, compensation became available 
both to voluntary evacuees and to people who chose to remain in 
devastated areas outside the “no-go” zone.20 
When human needs are greatest, legal professionals sometimes step 
forward, moved by duty, conscience, circumstance, a quest for 
reputation, or the scent of profit. To construct an initial catalogue of 
the types of issues that Japanese legal professionals are grappling with 
after the disasters, in late July 2011 we interviewed attorneys 
employed in private practice and by Hō Terasu, Japan’s version of 
Legal Aid; shihō shoshi, members of a class of legal professionals 
handling small claims, real property recording and registration, and 
document submission to courts; and community leaders assisting 
 
17 Id. 
18 Press Release, Tokyo Elec. Power Co., Genshiryoku jiko ni yoru songai ni tai-suru 
shiharai no torikumi jōkyō  ni tsuite [Handling of Payments for Damage Resulting from 
the Nuclear Power Accident] (May 31, 2011), available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc 
/press/11053104-j.html. 
19 Under the guidelines (proposed by a government committee and accepted by 
TEPCO), in the second round of compensation payments beginning in October 2011, 
individuals are to receive ¥100,000 per month (US$1250) for the first six months after the 
disaster, or ¥120,000 (US$1500) in cases of severe hardship such as removal to evacuation 
shelters, plus other provable losses. For the next six months, the monthly payments are 
halved. Subsequent compensation is not addressed. The geographic scope of businesses 
eligible for compensation is also widened. The guidelines will form the basis of 
compensation negotiations between TEPCO and those claiming injury. See Tokyo 
Denryoku K.K. Fukushima Dai-1, Dai-2 Hatsudensho jiko ni yoru genshiryoku songai no 
han’i no hantei-tō ni kansuru chūkan shishin [Interim Guidelines on Findings of Damages 
from the Accident at TEPCO Fukushima Power Plants No. 1 & 2], GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI 
BAISHŌ FUNSŌ SHINGIKAI [Dispute Resolution Committee for Nuclear Damage 
Compensation], (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016 
/houkoku/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/08/08/1309452_1_1.pdf. See also Official N-Crisis 
Compensation to Begin in Oct., THE DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 7, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri .co.jp/dy/national/T110806003091.htm (summarizing the guidelines). 
20 See Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō shingikai [Dispute Resolution Committee for 
Nuclear Damage Compensation]; Tokyo Denryoku K.K. Fukushima Dai-1, Dai-2 
Hatsudensho jiko ni yoru genshiryoku songai no han’i no hantei-tō ni kansuru chūkan 
shishin tsuiho (Jishuteki hinan-tō ni kakaru songai ni tsuite [Supplement to Interim 
Guidelines on Findings of Damages from the Accident at TEPCO Fukushima Power 
Plants No. 1 & 2 (Compensation of Voluntary Evacuees)] (Dec. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/houkoku/1315180.htm. 
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distressed business owners negotiating compensation claims. This is 
what we learned. 
II 
LEGAL PROFESSIONALS AND THE PROBLEMS DISASTER VICTIMS 
FACE 
The mountain of problems people face after a disaster is 
forbidding, and only some of the problems have legal handholds on 
which law professionals can offer some leverage. Disaster victims 
consulted our interviewees about the following problems: 
• People cannot return to their homes, either because their homes 
were destroyed or because they are within the “no-go” 
evacuation zone. Human flotsam from the disaster, many of 
these citizens were lodged in temporary shelters with severe 
inconveniences and no privacy, sweltering in the summer heat. 
Others are scattered around the country where their lives and 
their children’s schooling have been disrupted.21 
• People have business or personal debts coming due, but their 
employment was swept away, and they have no income 
available to fulfill their obligations. For some, their records of 
payments were destroyed in the tsunami. On top of these debts, 
they need cash to reconstruct their lives. 
• Under stress, marriages broke up. Some people need divorces. 
Others, who found new partners, need to make new family 
arrangements. 
• The almost 20,000 dead and missing have estates that need to be 
distributed. Who are the beneficiaries, and what are the assets? 
Often the wills and other records were destroyed by the tsunami. 
• What long-term health impacts can be expected from radiation 
exposure? The government’s and TEPCO’s reassurances of 
minimal adverse health effects are widely distrusted. 
• People whose homes were destroyed or rendered unlivable want 
to rebuild; can the mortgage on the old home be forgiven? 
 
21 87,000 Still in Limbo Five Months After Quake, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at 1, 
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110812a1.html (noting that as of late 
July 2011, about 87,000 evacuees from the three hardest-hit prefectures (Fukushima, 
Iwate, and Miyagi) were scattered around Japan). 
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• What compensation will be available from TEPCO or the 
government for ruined property? Unsellable crops and livestock? 
Destroyed businesses? Lost wages? Displacement expenses? 
Thefts from abandoned homes and businesses? 
• How can proof of damages be assembled? What qualifies as 
proof? 
• When will the compensation be distributed? Under what 
process? How are adverse decisions to be appealed? 
With a population of two million in an area slightly larger than 
Connecticut, Fukushima prefecture has only 155 attorneys22 and 284 
shihō shoshi (quasi-lawyers with limited law licenses).23 They were 
overwhelmed after the tsunami and meltdown by the enormous 
volume of questions such as those listed above. Rather than staying 
holed up in their offices, the legal professionals to whom we spoke 
organized forums in Fukushima City and in other towns outside the 
“no-go” evacuation zone to offer what assistance they could to 
evacuees and others damaged by the disasters. For the most part, they 
provided these consultations pro bono.24  
Legal professionals, we learned, play a wide variety of roles in 
disaster recovery assistance, and the most effective are adept at all of 
them. The following are among the roles our interviewees mentioned: 
• listener as disaster victims expressed their anxieties, 
uncertainties, and sense of helplessness; 
• general information provider about the various facts of the 
disaster and outside perspectives on its causes and effects; 
• problem identifier of issues (both legal and nonlegal) that 
disaster victims may not have recognized; 
 
22 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Bengoshi-kai bekkaiin-sū [Bar Association 
Membership by Prefecture] (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp 
/library/ja/jfba_info/membership/data/120301.pdf. 
23 Nihon shihō shoshi rengōkai [Japan Federation of Judicial Scriveners], Zenkoku 
shihō shoshikai ichiran [Directory of Japan Judicial Scriveners’ Associations] (Feb. 1, 
2012), available at http://www.shiho-shoshi.or.jp/association/shiho_shoshi_list.php. 
24 Interview with Mitsugi Araki, Attorney, Abukuma Law Office, in Fukushima 
Prefecture (July 29, 2011) (on file with author). 
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• general counselor regarding all sorts of issues in daily life, as 
well as access to administrative and charitable relief efforts and 
to political means of improving victims’ conditions; 
• legal counselor regarding disaster victims’ rights and the 
processes of enforcing them; 
• advocate on behalf of disaster victims in various forums and to 
various authorities, including legislators and politicians, national 
and prefectural bureaucrats, local public servants, TEPCO and 
other potentially responsible corporations, media, charitable 
organizations, and police; 
• coordinator linking disaster victims’ identified needs to 
ameliorative resources provided by legal professionals, 
volunteers, various levels of government, and organizations 
(farmers’, fishermen’s, and merchants’ associations) that should 
represent disaster victims’ interests; and 
• planner for the future—showing disaster victims the processes 
and agendas for future recovery, assuring the victims about the 
ways those processes will work, and helping them develop 
blueprints for their lives in the future.25 
A few examples of our conversations with these legal professionals 
follow, illustrating significant or unusual aspects of their recent work 
and experiences. 
A. The Legal Aid Lawyers: Kabata and Yorikane 
Takayoshi Kabata and Daisuke Yorikane are idealistic young 
attorneys with the Fukushima office of Hō Terasu, Japan’s 
government-funded legal aid organization.26 Both went to work for 
Hō Terasu not long after becoming lawyers and started working in 
Fukushima several months before the disaster.27 Both expressed 
satisfaction in having the freedom to choose to handle the cases and 
issues they think are most socially significant and important to their 
clientele, people of limited means.28 As Kabata remarked: 
 
25 See infra Parts II.A.–E. 
26 Hō Terasu is officially rendered in English as “Japan Legal Support Center.” 
27 Interview with Takayoshi Kabata and Daisuke Yorikane, Attorneys, Fukushima Hō 
Terasu Office, in Fukushima City, Japan (July 29, 2011) (on file with author). 
28 Id. 
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Our work has totally changed since the disaster. It’s usually a 
combination of civil, family, and criminal cases. Those continue, 
but on top of that, we have so many consultations in the disaster 
area and with the evacuees. Most of these people never thought that 
they might have legal issues to address or legal rights at stake—
they’re not used to consulting lawyers. So a lot of what we do is just 
listen to their problems. Some days I’ll spend the entire day in 
Minami-Sōma, the town just north of the nuclear plant, and then 
drive back to Fukushima City to take care of the rest of the work at 
night. The frustrating thing is, people will ask us what 
compensation will be available, when it will be available, what they 
have to do to get it—but we can’t give them a clear answer because 
the government hasn’t worked it out yet. All we can do is suggest 
that they gather and preserve all the evidence of their losses, their 
whereabouts during the crisis, and other relevant facts. It’s heart-
wrenching.29 
Kabata and Yorikane were able to report some problems as solved, 
or at least smoothed. For instance, insurance companies, attentive to 
matters of reputation and public opinion, have not been sticky about 
paying damage claims, even when proof of loss is imperfect.30 As 
another example, local governments provided evacuees at emergency 
shelters with standard boxed meals—adequate for most, but 
hazardous to people with special dietary needs such as elderly kidney 
disease patients.31 Hō Terasu submitted a petition to address the 
problem. “It took the government weeks to respond, but we finally 
got that fixed,” Kabata said.32 
The provisional partial compensation from TEPCO allotted to 
evacuees and damaged businesses in the weeks after the disaster was 
insufficient for most recipients, and a new round of payments was  
offered under interim guidelines released by the central government 
in early August 2011 and agreed to by TEPCO.33 Inevitably, disputes 
will arise about who is entitled to what amount. Kabata and Yorikane 
foresee three main routes to resolution of the disputes. The first is for 
residents and businesses simply to accept the amounts specified in the 






33 See Fukushima Food Producers Protest, supra note 13. 
34 Kabata & Yorikane, supra note 27. 
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alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process and negotiate for more.35 
Third, disputes not settled through ADR will go to court.36 
The ADR process was launched in September 2011. As of 
February 2012, however, few cases have been resolved through 
ADR.37 Issues that will inevitably arise in court, such as the extent to 
which cases will be tried individually or through mass litigation, 
remain to be resolved. Judicial and administrative precedents provide 
no clear answers.38 
We expected to find some tension between Hō Terasu lawyers, 
who work for lower-income clients on a salaried basis, and the private 
bar, which will earn fees for client representation in ADR and court 
proceedings. We found examples of both cooperation and friction 
between Hō Terasu lawyers and the private bar. 
When he first came to Fukushima, Kabata reported, there was 
concern among the local bar members that Hō Terasu might represent 
a competitive threat.39 “But those days are long gone,” said Kabata. 
“There’s so much work that needs to be done that we’re all 
cooperating. The bar association here has been quite supportive.”40 
This level of cooperation between local lawyers and Hō Terasu, 
however, is by no means universal, as the experience of neighboring 
Miyagi prefecture attests. At the time of our field research, not a 
single Hō Terasu attorney was stationed in Miyagi, one of the 
prefectures hit hardest by the earthquake and tsunami (see Figure 2), 




37 According to Tsuguo Asai and Tetsuya Yamada, Director and Deputy Director 
respectively of the ADR Center in Koriyama, Fukushima Prefecture, 1026 cases had been 
filed as of Feb. 22, 2012; settlement proposals had been filed in thirty-five of these cases, 
and in only nine cases had a settlement been reached. Interview by coauthor Masayuki 
Murayama with Tsuguo Asai and Tetsuya Yamada, ADR Director & Deputy Director, in 
Koriyama, Japan (Feb. 23, 2012) (on file with author). 
38 See Saiban-gai funsō kaiketsu tetsuzuki no riyō no sokushin ni kansuru hō [ADR 
Promotion Law], Law No. 151 of 1994, art. 26 (Japan), http://law.e-gov.go.jp 
/announce/H16HO151.html (giving courts the authority to stay litigation when the same 
dispute is pending in an ADR proceeding). 
39 Kabata & Yorikane, supra note 27. 
40 Id. 
41 E-mail from Tetsuo Ōishi, Head of Hō Terasu Internal Audit Section, to Shozo Ota, 
Coauthor (Aug. 15, 2011) (on file with author) (also noting that Hō Terasu was slated to 
have a presence in Miyagi beginning in late 2011). 
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B. The Limited-Practice Legal Professional: Suganami 
Yoshiko Suganami is a shihō shoshi, a type of limited-practice 
independent legal professional unique to Japan.42 An outspoken 
redhead of about forty, her office was located in the town of Ohno, 
two and a half miles from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear reactors. She 
was ordered to evacuate but could not for a week after the meltdown 
because no gasoline was available.43 Without electricity, her home 
was uninhabitable, and she slept in her car that winter week.44 
From her new office in Fukushima City, she deals with the wide 
range of problems facing evacuees. “So many families are torn apart,” 
she remarked. 
The husband has to stay and work if he still has a job, and the wife 
and kids move away so the kids can go to school somewhere that 
radiation isn’t a concern. They argue about money—one wants to 
use TEPCO’s provisional compensation payment to pay off debts, 
and the other says living expenses are more important. There are a 
lot of divorces from all the tensions. Most people want to move 
back home, but they don’t know when they’ll be able to, or whether 
their houses are livable.45 
Suganami reflected on a dilemma facing people who lost family 
members in the tsunami. “The Buddhist priests have all left the 
temples in the evacuation zone. Who will take care of the graves? I 
wouldn’t want my parent to be buried alone somewhere, away from 
the family gravesite.”46 
C. The Community Leaders in Minami-Sōma: Matsumoto and 
Araki 
Toshiyuki Matsumoto and Chieko Araki are community leaders in 
Minami-Sōma, a coastal town just north of the Fukushima No. 1 
nuclear power plant (see Figure 1). Part of the town is located within 
 
42 Shihō shoshi, members of a licensed class of quasi-lawyers, are permitted to handle 
small claims, real property recording and registration, and document submission to courts. 
Their profession is threatened by the recent relaxation of standards for bar exam passage 
since attorneys can perform all the tasks previously assigned to shihō shoshi. As a result, 
shihō shoshi are eager to demonstrate their raison d’être by pointing to their pro bono 
efforts on behalf of needy citizens such as disaster victims. 
43 Interview with Yoshiko Suganami, Yu Haga, & Katsuteru Inoue, Shihō Shoshi, in 
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the twelve-mile “no-go” zone, but most is just outside it (our Geiger 
counter readings showed very low levels of radiation on July 30, 
2011).47 Minami-Sōma is perhaps unique among towns outside the 
“no-go” evacuation zone in that it was directly hit by the full triple 
whammy of earthquake, tsunami, and meltdown.48 
Matsumoto, a straightforward, no-nonsense man in his fifties, is 
head of the 400-member Minshō organization of local small business 
owners affiliated with the Japan Communist Party. Matsumoto assists 
local merchants in applying for TEPCO provisional compensation 
payments, gathering needed information for the applications (lost 
stock-in-trade and previous year’s income) and filling out the TEPCO 
forms.49 Araki, a slight, soft-spoken woman of similar age, is a city 
councilwoman. Both are members of the Communist Party, well 
versed in building up the party organization by responding effectively 
to local concerns—Matsumoto wears a red Minshō armband as he 
goes about his work. “TEPCO’s not fussy about paying, as long as 
you have the right paperwork,” Matsumoto explained.50 Expressing a 
concern shared by all the disaster victims, however, he continued: 
“The question is, when we get past these partial payments and it 
comes time for TEPCO to pay the full amount of damages they owe, 
what kind of financial shape will TEPCO be in, and how much of 
what they owe will they be able to pay? A fifth? A tenth?”51 
D. The Small-Town Lawyer in Minami-Sōma: Wakasugi 
Yūji Wakasugi is a small-town lawyer in his thirties who lives and 
practices in Minami-Sōma. He gives free legal consultations to 
residents there and in Sōma, the next town to the north.52 He offered 
particular insights into the dilemmas the residents face. 
“A large proportion of the houses in Sōma and Minami-Sōma were 
damaged by the earthquake or inundated by the tsunami,” Wakasugi 
explained.53 
 
47 See fig.1. 
48 Interview with Toshiyuki Matsumoto and Chieko Araki, Community Leaders, in 




52 Interview with Yūji Wakasugi, Attorney, in Minami-Sōma, Japan (July 30, 2011) (on 
file with author). 
53 Id. 
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Lots of those homeowners had mortgages, and the payments are 
coming due. But how can a person be willing to pay the debt for a 
house that doesn’t exist any more? And consider rental housing 
that’s damaged but may still be habitable. The landlord wants it torn 
down so he doesn’t incur repair expenses, and maybe he can collect 
on earthquake insurance if he had any. The tenants don’t want to 
leave, since they don’t have any other place to go. Who’s going to 
decide? Those are the kinds of legal problems that are coming to 
light.54 
Farmers, too, face serious dilemmas, according to Wakasugi. 
To receive compensation, people have to prove their fields, paddies, 
and orchards are contaminated by radioactive fallout. But that 
simultaneously brands their produce as unsellable. In other words, if 
they want to rebuild their lives here, they have to keep their mouths 
shut about radioactive contamination. But no evidence of 
contamination may mean no compensation. Neighbors end up on 
opposite sides. At one farm, they’re wearing face masks when they 
go outside, fearing radioactive dust. At the next, they’re getting 
ready to sell their rice or peaches on the market.55 
Wakasugi recounted the story of an idealistic college friend who 
moved up to Minami-Sōma from the Tokyo area, borrowing money to 
open a restaurant serving only healthful organic food and working 
with local farmers to produce it. “With the nuclear disaster, that’s all 
gone. He had to move away,” Wakasugi said. “There’s no 
compensation for lost dreams.”56 
E. The Iwaki City Lawyer: Watanabe 
Toshihiko Watanabe is a young private attorney in Iwaki, a city to 
which many evacuees fled, twenty-five miles south of the nuclear 
plant. His home, separated from the nearby ocean by a canal, was 
spared from the tsunami by the canal’s dissipation of the waves’ 
force.57 He and his associates spent much of the months since the 
disaster counseling people whose lives were disrupted.58 Based on 
those experiences, Watanabe offered some assessments of the efficacy 





57 Interview with Toshihiko Watanabe, Attorney, Hamadōri Law Office, in Iwaki, 
Japan (July 31, 2011). 
58 Id. 
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Of TEPCO’s initial provisional compensation payment of ¥2.5 
million (US$31,000) to businesses in the “no-go” zone, Watanabe 
remarked: 
There’s nothing you can do but laugh. How can business people 
who have lost everything get going again with that? True, the Bank 
of Japan’s policy is to encourage banks to make loans available on 
easy terms, with not much paperwork. But sooner or later, that 
principal has to be paid back. Restaurant owners, sport fishing 
outfitters—what good is a loan if there aren’t any customers? They 
can’t formulate a business plan. How are the farmers going to 
market their rice or fruit or beef or pork, when the “Fukushima 
produce” label is death to sales?59 
Watanabe also discussed the outpouring of volunteer assistance to 
victims of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis. Students, office 
workers, legal and medical professionals, people from all walks of life 
came to Fukushima and the other devastated prefectures to help out. 
Watanabe’s appreciative but trenchant assessment of those volunteer 
efforts will be familiar to veterans of Katrina.60 “What’s needed most 
is coordination—matching volunteers’ skills with appropriate jobs. 
Especially people who are good with people! So much energy and 
effort could have been put to better use,” said Watanabe.61 As for the 
attorneys from around Japan who came to Fukushima to share the 
load, 
they provided valuable services in a time of need. But I do wonder 
at some of them, charging ¥5000 (US$60) for a half-hour consult, 
when we locals are doing the same thing better for free. I guess 
some of them were burnishing their reputations by coming up here 
to volunteer. Maybe a financial contribution might have been more 
useful.62 
The sheer scale of the tragedy came home to us most forcefully 
when attorney Watanabe drove us to Usuiso, once a thriving 
beachfront community in Iwaki where, as a child, Watanabe used to 
go swimming with his friends. The town stands at the base of a line of 
hills, with a ten-foot seawall separating the buildings from the beach. 
Ten feet was nowhere near enough of a barrier. The wave 
 
59 Id.; see Shinsuke Ishiguro & Yomiuri Shimbum, Fukushima Farmers in a Jam / 
Fruit Growers See Orders Plunge Due to Fears over Radiation, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), 
Aug. 14, 2011, at 3, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110813002913 
.htm. 
60 Watanabe, supra note 57. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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overwhelmed it all. Now second- and third-story windows stand open 
to the sky, their glass washed away. It is a ghost town. Hundreds died 
there, including some of Watanabe’s childhood friends. No one has 
returned to live. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
Japan’s economy is sluggish, its public debt level (as a proportion 
of gross domestic product) far surpasses that of the United States,63 its 
birthrate and population are declining,64 and its politics are in 
shambles. The country is not in a position to recover easily from the 
knockdown blows of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster of 
March 11, 2011. 
Yet there is evident in the residents of Fukushima, and in Japan as 
a whole, a gritty spirit, a clear-eyed determination to set things right. 
Tokyo bureaucracy may be slow-moving and national politics riven 
with faction, but a general political and administrative consensus has 
formed that the nation’s resources must be devoted to rebuilding the 
damaged region. Even more encouraging, after the tsunami, a 
counter-tide of passionate young people flooded into northeast Japan, 
committed to helping people whose lives are disrupted, using social 
media to inform, organize, and raise massive donations.65 Shouldering 
past the inertia-ridden central government, local leaders in places such 
as Minami-Sōma are performing cleanups of debris and hot spots.66 
Bulldozers, backhoes, forklifts, and road graders are working 
everywhere. 
 
63 Country Comparisons: Public Debt, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186rank.html 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (indicating public debt/GDP ratios of 2.08 for Japan and 0.69 
for United States). 
64 Nihon no shōrai suikei jinkō (Heisei 24-nen 1-gatsu suikei) [Japan’s Estimated 
Future Population], NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF POPULATION & SOCIAL SECURITY 
RESEARCH (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/newest04 
/h1_1.html (official estimate of Japan’s population of 128.1 million in 2010, declining to 
127.5 million in 2012, 124 million in 2020, and 112 million in 2035). 
65 Kenji Shibuya et al., Future of Japan’s System of Good Health at Low Cost with 
Equity: Beyond Universal Coverage, 378 LANCET 1265, 1271 (2011). 
66 Minami-Soma to Clean Hot Spots in City, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 8, 2011, at 
1, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110807002708.htm. 
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Into the beach sand at Usuiso, next to a memorial to the tsunami’s 
victims, is driven a post bearing an inscription of an old Japanese 
adage: Nana korobi, ya oki—“Fall seven times; rise eight.” 
 
